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[As the World Trade Organization approaches its ten-year anniversary, the 
long-discussed issue of linking the right to trade with the enforcement of cer-
tain labour standards continues to persist. However, the discourse on the is-
sue has hit a stalemate of late. In the hope of overcoming the stalemate and 
moving toward effective solutions on the issue, this paper explains and ex-
amines four types of “conceptual differentiations” that currently underpin a 
significant portion of the labour linkage discourse. The “conceptual differ-
entiations” examined are trade/non-trade; north/south; liberalisa-
tion/protectionism; economic development/poverty; consumption/  
production; universalist/relativist; WTO/ILO; and sanctions/welfare. A pol-
icy proposal for further discussion on the issue is then presented, based on  
a re-conceptualisation of the “conceptual differentiations” discussed.] 
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I INTRODUCTION 
 
From tabloid stories to academic debate, the current unprecedented volume of 
international trade is increasingly being spoken of within the same stories as work-
ing conditions and labour markets. Within this discourse, the labour-related ramifi-
cations of increased international trade are used to both support and criticise the 
institutions that regulate it. In particular, the World Trade Organization (WTO) is 
hailed at one end of the spectrum as a framework through which more and better 
jobs are being created, yet at the other is protested against as a driving force behind 
the exploitation of workers. The WTO itself, however, has been largely silent on 
labour-related issues. The fact that this silence is accompanied by a growth in the 
WTO’s overall scope and reach into both international and domestic economic life 
has therefore served to intensify the discourse on the “link” between labour and 
trade.1 Within this discourse, some actors are in favour of the WTO playing a direct 
role in enforcing certain practices with regard to the treatment of workers. This 
“pro-linkage” argument is not new; the Charter of the International Trade Organiza-
tion, the original institution designed nearly sixty years ago to regulate international 
trade, contained a “social clause” that would have required its members to prevent 
“unfair labour conditions”.2 What is new, however, is the context within which the 
labour linkage discourse is taking place and the different types of pro- and anti-
linkage arguments this has produced. 
 
One current feature that particularly stands out in the labour linkage discourse is 
that pro- and anti-linkage proponents are talking past one another.3 Somewhat of a 
stalemate has come about, in that the types of arguments appearing in the discourse 
rarely engage with each other. Part of the problem is that much of the discourse is 
based on a set of “conceptual differentiations”, which in turn are based on largely 
unquestioned assumptions.4 This has resulted in the discourse leaving a large range 
of policy options unexplored. This author therefore believes the labour linkage 
discourse should continue, not as an end in itself but as a way of threshing out all 
possibilities before the concept of linkage is abandoned in favour of the status quo 
or a complete overhaul of the system. As such, this paper aims to stimulate the 
labour linkage discourse into exploring new ground. Part II provides a brief over-
view of the background behind the current stalemate. Part III explains and examines 
four types of “conceptual differentiations” that currently underpin a significant 
portion of the labour linkage discourse. These relate to the concept of linkage; the 
actors within the labour linkage discourse; the theologies sustaining the anti-linkage 
                                                            
1
 Frank J. Garcia, Trade and Justice: Linking the Trade Linkage Debates, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 
391, 393 (1998). 
2
 Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, art 7, U.N. Doc E/CONF.2178 (1948). Due 
to several factors, in particular the fact that the Charter was never ratified by the United States, the 
International Trade Organization was never established. 
3
 Raj Bhala, Clarifying the Trade-Labor Link, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L.11, 55 (1998). 
4
 See below Part III. 
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argument; and regime-related linkage issues. For the purposes of getting the ball 
rolling on the reinvigoration of the labour linkage discourse, Part IV then puts 
forward a model of linkage that touches on some of the possibilities opened up by 
an examination of the “conceptual differentiations” addressed in Part III. 
 
II THE STALEMATE IN THE LABOUR LINKAGE DISCOURSE 
 
For the past 25 years, various governments of the United States, Canada, and the 
European Union, along with a broad range of civil society organisations throughout 
the world, have argued that international trade law should in some way be linked to 
labour standards.5 At the 1994 Marrakesh Ministerial Conference which brought the 
WTO into being, almost every delegation brought up the issue. Polarised views on 
it, however, prevented an agreement being reached.6 In particular, several large less 
economically developed countries (LEDCs), including India, China and Brazil, 
expressed a keen desire to see the issue dropped from the WTO agenda entirely.7 
The extent of this disagreement with the pro-linkage position resulted in the cancel-
lation of a planned address by the Director-General of the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) to the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Conference. In the Declara-
tion that resulted from this Conference, the ministers stated that the ILO, as op-
posed to the WTO, “is the competent body to set and deal with [labour] standards”.8 
The ministers also declared that they “reject the use of labour standards for protec-
tionist purposes, and agree that the comparative advantage of countries, particularly 
low-wage developing countries, must in no way be put into question.”9 At the 
Seattle Ministerial in 1999, a Clinton Administration proposal that a Working 
Group be established within the WTO to examine the linkage issue in greater detail 
was rejected.10 Support for the Singapore Ministerial Declaration was later reiter-
ated at the Doha Ministerial in 2001.11 
 
                                                            
5
 See, eg, Daniel A. Zaheer, Breaking the Deadlock: Why and How Developing Countries Should Accept 
Labor Standards in the WTO, 9 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 69, 71 (2003). 
6
 World Trade Organization, Briefing Note: Trade and Labour Standards  
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min99_e/english/about_e/18lab_e.htm> (last visited 
Aug. 17, 2004). 
7
 See, eg, Gary S. Fields, International Labor Standards and Decent Work: Perspectives from the 
Developing World in INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS: GLOBALISATION, TRADE, AND PUBLIC 
POLICY, 70 (Robert J. Flanagan & William B. Gould IV eds., 2003). 
8
 Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc WT/MIN(96)/DEC (1996) [4] (Declaration adopted at 
the Singapore Ministerial Conference on 13 December 1996). (Emphasis added.) The Declaration did go 
on to reaffirm WTO support for the very limited “existing collaboration” between the WTO and the ILO 
Secretariats. 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Sarah H. Cleveland, Why International Labor Standards? in INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS: 
GLOBALIZATION, TRADE AND PUBLIC POLICY, 149 (Robert J. Flanagan & William B. Gould IV eds., 
2003). 
11
 Doha Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (2001) [8] (Declaration adopted at the 
Doha Ministerial Conference on 14 November 2001). 
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The pro-linkage argument is essentially two-pronged: first, pro-linkage proponents 
argue that an absence of linkage is harmful to workers in LEDCs; second, the 
absence of linkage is said to also be harmful to workers in economically developed 
countries (EDCs). The argument that an absence of linkage is harmful to workers in 
LEDCs is based on the notion that, in many of these countries, the market failures 
which produce poor labour conditions are often not corrected by national policies.12 
As such, linkage is argued as necessary to provide a financial disincentive for 
countries to export products that are produced under what are deemed unacceptable 
working conditions. Given the financial rewards available from being able to ex-
port, these disincentives will in turn supposedly motivate employers, governments 
and unions into exerting their best efforts to prevent harmful treatment towards 
workers. The argument that linkage is required for the sake of workers in EDCs is 
sometimes put in openly protectionist terms, as in one United States union’s claim 
that linkage is required in order to “protect good union jobs in this country”.13 
Others couch the argument in terms of EDC workers being exposed to an unfair 
race to the bottom,14 or that countries which undermine hard-won labour standards 
in EDCs are engaging in a kind of “social dumping”.15 Linkage is therefore seen as 
necessary to prevent a “beggar thy neighbour” scenario, whereby countries are 
forced to undermine each other’s labour standards in order to remain economically 
competitive.16 
 
Anti-linkage proponents often respond to the call for linkage by claiming that those 
behind the call are simply acting in their own self-interest. Former Malaysian Prime 
Minister Mahathir, for example, has stated that “sanctimonious pronouncements”, 
such as those made by North Americans about the welfare of Malaysian workers, 
“are likely to be motivated by a… selfish desire to put as many obstacles as possi-
ble in the way of anyone attempting to catch up and compete with the West.”17 
LEDCs opposed to labour linkage claim that their future development relies on 
maintaining a competitive advantage by keeping wages sufficiently lower than in 
EDCs. These LEDCs also claim that it is hypocritical of EDCs to seek to impose 
labour standards on LEDCs, given that EDCs had scant regard for labour standards 
during the early stages of their own economic growth.18 The fact that labour linkage 
                                                            
12
 Robert J. Flanagan, Labor Standards and International Competitive Advantage in INTERNATIONAL 
LABOR STANDARDS: GLOBALISATION, TRADE, AND PUBLIC POLICY, 15 (Robert J. Flanagan & William 
B. Gould IV eds., 2003). 
13
 Bruce Raynor, President of the United States Union of Needle-Trades, Industrial and Textile Employ-
ees, cited in Fields, supra note 7, at 68. 
14
 See, eg, MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
454 (2d ed. 1999). 
15
 See, eg, Elissa Alben, GATT and the Fair Wage: a Historical Perspective on the Labor-Trade Link, 
101 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1415 (2001). The related notion of regulatory subsidies is discussed below in 
Part III(C)(1). 
16
 TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 14, at 12. 
17
 Mahathir Mohamad, East Asia Will Find Its Own Roads to Democracy, Int’l Herald Trib., May 17, 
1994 at 6. 
18
 On this point, Kennedy draws an analogy between labour rights in international trade and international 
humanitarian law, in that both involve those with rulership seeking to prohibit the practices and/or 
weapons which they no longer require: David Kennedy, Reassessing International Humanitarianism, 
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proponents are usually not arguing for the right of workers in LEDCs to simply 
migrate to EDCs in order to enjoy EDCs’ higher working standards is also cited as 
an example of the hypocrisy and protectionist motives behind many linkage argu-
ments.19 
 
Some anti-linkage commentators do recognise that there is an “altruistic” set of pro-
linkage arguments, but claim that that these arguments are misguided and have been 
strategically appropriated by “egotistical” desires.20 They argue that the altruistic 
desire to see an end to poverty in the global South21 would be best served by eco-
nomic development rather than labour linkage.22 Any sanctions that result from 
linkage would, it is argued, destroy jobs and therefore harm those whom they are 
intended to be protecting.23 In addition, anti-linkage proponents argue that linkage 
is an invasion of sovereignty, in that it takes away the nation-state’s autonomy over 
the production processes within its jurisdiction,24 and imposes universal standards 
without regard for local circumstances or preferences.25 Labour linkage is portrayed 
as a concept inimical to the WTO’s goal of ending protectionism,26 so it is deemed 
necessary to institutionally cordon off trade from labour by promoting the rigid 
separation of responsibilities between the WTO and ILO as articulated in the Sin-
gapore Ministerial Declaration.27 Underlying many of these arguments is a belief 
that trade is in fact an entirely distinct concept from labour and that attempts to link 
them are therefore conceptually unsound.28 
 
In response to some of the anti-linkage arguments, many pro-linkage advocates 
have begun to focus on arguing for linkage of a specified set of “core labour 
rights”.29 This paradigm shift represents what could be termed a deontological 
approach to labour standards, in which the aim is not to harmonise worldwide 
labour standards or make an impact upon labour standards across different strata of 
workplaces (through, for example, the establishment of wage-setting frameworks30), 
but to provide a safety net involving the elimination of working conditions “so 
odious or harmful that it would be better for [the workers exposed to them] not to 
work at all”.31 Somewhat of a consensus is forming among pro-linkage advocates 
that the best way to determine such conditions is by reference to the ILO Declara-
                                                                                                                                          
speech delivered at the Allen Hope Southey Memorial Lecture, University of Melbourne, (8 June 2004). 
See also Bhala, supra note 3, at 27. 
19
 JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION 244 (2004). 
20
 See generally Jagdish Bhagwati, The Question of Linkage, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 126 (2002). 
21
 The problems associated with references to the global North and South are discussed below in Part 
III(B). 
22
 See below Part III(C)(2). 
23
 See below Part III(D)(3). 
24
 See below Part III(C)(3). 
25
 See below Part III(D)(1). 
26
 See below Part III(C)(1). 
27
 See below Part III(D)(2). 
28
 See below Part III(A). 
29
 See, eg, TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 14, at 441-62; Fields, supra note 7, at 64-74; Cleveland, 
supra note 10, at 137-59; and Zaheer, supra note 5. Contra Alben, supra note 15. 
30
 See, eg, Alben, supra note 15, at 1415. 
31
 Fields, supra note 7, at 67. 
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tion.32 Rather than coming up with a “laundry list” of workplace rights and princi-
ples as appears in the European Social Charter,33 the ILO Declaration includes just 
four fundamental rights at work, which all ILO members34 are required to uphold 
(regardless of whether they have ratified the relevant conventions): freedom of 
association, freedom from forced labour, freedom from child labour and freedom 
from discrimination.35 A broad-based ILO-sponsored commission on globalisation 
recently found that through “international consensus”, it has been established that 
“this particular set of core labour standards with universal reach constitutes the 
minimum rules for labour in the global economy.”36 It is possible to find all the 
rights contained in the ILO Declaration within the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights,37 an intersection that is reminiscent of the common genesis of international 
labour law and international human rights law — the abolition of slavery.38 Al-
though some supporters of labour linkage identify groups of core rights that include 
more rights than those identified in the ILO Declaration,39 and others would take 
away some,40 there is a growing consensus that the core rights approach to labour 
linkage is to be preferred over approaches that may directly disturb the ability of 
countries to build competitive advantages, to some extent, on low-wages.41 In spite 
of such a move, which seems intent to demonstrate that the “trade and labour rights 
link is not some fanatical or protectionist adventure to attempt harmonisation of 
conditions across the world”,42 there has not been any significantly fresh debate 
with anti-linkage proponents; both sides continue to exist as “two solitudes”.43 Part 
of the reason for this may be underlying, unexamined “conceptual differentiations”, 
to which this paper now turns. 
 
                                                            
32
 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, adopted at the 86th Session of the 
International Labour Conference, 18 June 1998. 
33
 Bhala, supra note 3, at 30. 
34
 With 177 member states, the ILO has the largest international membership of all the UN-affiliated 
bodies. (The WTO has 148 member states.) 
35
 ILO Declaration art 2. 
36
 ILO World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, A Fair Globalization: Creating 
Opportunities for All (2004) 92. 
37
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. GAOR, G.A. Res. 217A, 3rd Sess., 183rd plen mtg, U.N. 
Doc A/810 (1948). Freedom of association is protected under arts 20(1) and 23(4), freedom from being 
forced to work is protected under arts 4 and 23(1), and discrimination is prohibited under arts 7 and 
23(2). Art 5, prohibiting “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment”, can be read as a prohibition on child 
labour. 
38
 Cleveland, supra note 10, at 137. 
39
 Cleveland, for example, would add freedom from employment in ultra-hazardous conditions, a right to 
subsistence wages and a right to equal protection for migrant workers: Ibid. 
40
 The OECD would only prohibit exploitative forms of child labour rather than all forms of child labour: 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Trade, Employment and Labour Standards: 
A Study of Core Workers’ Rights and International Trade (1996). Zaheer would take away anti-
discrimination and adopt a phased introduction to the prohibition on child labour: Zaheer, supra note 5, 
at 98-9. 
41
 Cleveland, supra note 10, at 154 . See also TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 14, at 462. 
42
 TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 14, at 462. 
43
 Brian Langille, Labor Standards in the Globalized Economy, in INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS 
AND ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 330 (Werner Segenberger & Duncan Campbell eds.,1994), cited in 
Sundhya Pahuja, Trading Spaces: Locating Sites for Challenge Within International Trade Law, 14 
AUST. FEM. L. J. 38, 40 (2000). 
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III “CONCEPTUAL DIFFERENTIATIONS” IN THE LABOUR 
LINKAGE DISCOURSE 
 
According to Koskenniemi, legal argument always proceeds by establishing a 
“system of conceptual differentiations” through which doctrines, positions or rules 
in support of a particular argument are justified.44 This is done by establishing 
Opposites against which the components of the argument can define themselves and 
in relation to which position themselves as superior. While dialectic reasoning may 
be an inevitable aspect of legal argument,45 a dynamic discourse requires that the 
conceptual differentiations upon which its arguments are founded to be constantly 
exposed to an analysis that reveals their “deep-structure”.46 What this is often likely 
to show is that the conceptual differentiations relied upon are not mutually exclu-
sive and are in fact largely mutually dependent.47 Such revelations therefore have 
the potential to pave the way for established conceptual differentiations to be recon-
structed and for the discourse to continue in a reinvigorated form. 
 
Although labour linkage discourse is by no means new,48 the conceptual differentia-
tions that form the discourse as a whole are yet to undergo a thorough analysis. This 
may partly explain the stalemate at which the debate currently finds itself. This Part 
therefore seeks to identify the key conceptual differentiations underpinning the 
labour linkage discourse, and to question the assumptions upon which they rest. 
These conceptual differentiations can be understood as falling into four broad and 
interrelated types of dichotomies: the conceptual dichotomy, the actors dichotomy, 
theological dichotomies, and regime dichotomies. These four categories will be 
addressed in turn. 
 
A The Conceptual Dichotomy 
The most central conceptual differentiation in the linkage discourse relates to the 
concept of linkage itself. This argument proceeds by establishing a dichotomy 
between “trade” and “non-trade” issues, and assigning labour to the latter. After 
classifying labour as a non-trade issue, the anti-linkage discourse then describes 
labour in the context of linkage as “contamination”49 or as one of many “insects on 
a warm night”, attracted to the bright light of the WTO.50 Three former 
                                                            
44
 MARTII KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
ARGUMENT xxi (1989). 
45
 Or, in fact, any natural process: See generally Friedrich Engels, Dialectics of Nature (Clemens Dutt 
trans, first published 1882, 1940 ed) [trans of: Dialektik der Natur]. 
46
 KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 44, at xvii. 
47
 Ibid xxi. 
48
 See above Parts I and II. 
49
 See, eg, CUTS Centre for International Trade, Economics and Environment, Enough Is Enough: Third 
World Intellectuals and NGOs’ Statement Against Linkages, Consumer Unity and Trust Society (India), 
15 November 1999 <http://cuts-international.org/linkages-twinsal.htm> (last visited Sep. 10, 2004). 
50
 Steve Charnovitz, Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 792, 832 (2001). 
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GATT51/WTO Directors-General have also warned that “the WTO cannot be used 
as a Christmas tree on which to hang any and every good cause”.52 Trade is thus 
conceived as pure, enlightening and value-free, while labour linkage is impure, 
annoying and decadent. 
 
What this binary logic overlooks, however, is the simple economic fact that traded 
goods or services will inevitably involve input in the form of human labour.53 While 
Smith and Marx may not have agreed on who is best suited to own the means of 
production (natural resources and infrastructural capital), both identified labour as 
an indispensable factor in the production of commodities, and therefore a crucial 
element of trade. Indeed, it seems both Smith and Marx, from opposite ends of the 
political spectrum, attempted to portray their theories as scientific by implicitly 
drawing analogies between chemical reactions and the yielding of tradable com-
modities by combining the means of production with the additional ingredient of 
human labour.54 As artificial as the analogy might sound to the postmodern ear, this 
“chemical equation of production” does serve to deconstruct the notion that the 
concept of trade can in some way be hermetically separated from the labour that is 
embedded in traded commodities. 
 
In addition to this economic critique of the conceptual differentiation between trade 
and labour, there is a strong legal critique of the hermetic separation of the two 
concepts, in that international trade law is already linked to labour and many other 
“non-trade” concerns. As mentioned above, the drafters of the Havana Charter 
expressly linked labour and trade.55 Even the GATT as it stands, through Article 
XX(e), provides for an express general exception in relation to products produced 
with prison labour. Other provisions of the GATT arguably imply labour linkage 
exists.56 In addition, the GATT-consistent Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) 
regimes established by the United States and the European Union — which together 
account for over 35 percent of world imports57 — both allow for these Members to 
withdraw trade preferences upon finding a systematic violation of any of the core 
labour rights,58 apart from anti-discrimination, within a preference-receiver’s juris-
                                                            
51
 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signatures 30 October 1947, 55 UNTS 194 
(entered into force 1 January 1948). 
52
 Cited in Steve Charnovitz, Triangulating the World Trade Organization, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 28 (2002). 
53
 See, eg, Ruth Rikowski, Value: the Life Blood of Capitalism, 1 POL’Y FUT. EDU. 160 (2003). 
54
 See generally ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (first published 1776, 1976 ed), and KARL 
MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (VOL 1) (Charles H Kerr trans, first published 
1867, 1976 ed) [trans of: Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie]. 
55
 See above Part I. 
56
 See, eg, Salman Bal, International Free Trade Agreements and Human Rights: Reinterpreting Article 
XX of the GATT, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 62 (2001). See also Robert Howse, Back to Court After 
Shrimp/Turtle? Almost but not Quite Yet: India’s Short Lived Challenge to Labor and Environmental 
Exceptions in the European Union’s Generalized System of Preferences, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1333 
(2003). 
57International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook: April 2004,  
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2004/01/data/index.htm> (last visited Sep. 29, 2004). This 
figure is the total combined imports of these two WTO Members, not imports under their GSP regimes. 
58
 See above Part II. 
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diction.59 As these regimes are applied unilaterally, they are susceptible to inconsis-
tent and politically-motivated enforcement.60 Historical and existing labour linkage 
therefore not only breaks down what Pahuja terms the “conceptual quarantine” 
between trade and labour,61 but it also demonstrates how the state of denial inherent 
in this dichotomy can actually undermine the multilateral trading system.62 
 
In addition to labour itself, a whole range of concerns which are equally if not more 
“non-trade” than labour are now deeply embedded in trade law — behind its “fa-
cade of neutrality”.63 For example, Members are now prohibited, by the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs),64 from tying investment to local 
content requirements. Similarly, the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs)65 prohibits Members from freely adopting technology. 
Aside from the economic impacts these instruments have on LEDCs,66 their incor-
poration into the WTO highlights the arbitrariness, if not the hegemonic applica-
tion, of the trade/non-trade dichotomy. TRIMs and TRIPs are not focussed on 
reducing barriers to either trade in shares or to trade in intellectual property rights, 
as their names might suggest; both instruments simply establish regulatory regimes 
that affect trade flows.67 In fact, TRIPs may even hinder trade by granting monop-
oly rights over trade in protected products.68 TRIMs and TRIPs are therefore exam-
ples of mere “strategic linkage” with trade,69 and demonstrate for better or for 
worse the expansion of the WTO’s mandate and impact beyond what might be 
considered “trade” in a narrow sense of the concept.70 This expansion has in turn 
attracted calls for the WTO to be renamed the World Economic Organization to 
better reflect what it has come to be.71 
 
                                                            
59
 Lance Compa and Jeffrey S. Vogt, Labor Rights in the Generalized System of Preferences: a 20-year 
Review, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 199, 237 (2001). For example, the European Union has suspended 
preferences to Myanmar in response to an ILO finding into forced labour practices there: Cleveland, 
supra note 10, at 134. 
60
 TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 14, at 462-3. 
61
 Pahuja, supra note 43, at 43. 
62
 Cleveland, supra note 10, at 145. 
63
 Pahuja, supra note 43, at 40. 
64
 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Investment Measures, opened for signatures 15 April 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 UNTS 187 (entered 
into force 1 January 1995). 
65
 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, opened for signatures 15 April 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 UNTS 299 
(entered into force 1 January 1995). 
66
 See, eg, Peter Costantini, What’s Wrong with the WTO?, November 2001 
<http://www.speakeasy.org/~peterc/wtow/> (last visited Aug. 19, 2004). 
67
 Chantal Thomas, Should the World Trade Organization Incorporate Labor and Environmental 
Standards?, 61WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347, 393-401 (2004). Thomas notes that the same applies to 
competition policy, which is currently on the table for incorporation into the WTO. 
68
 See, eg, Laurinda L. Hicks and James R. Holbein, Convergence of National Intellectual Property 
Norms in International Trading Agreements, 12 AM. U. J. INT’L L. POL’Y 769, 771 (1997). 
69
 David W. Leebron, Linkages, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 5, 13 (2002). 
70
 Adelle Blackett, Mapping the Equilibrium Line: Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and the 
Interpretive Universe of the World Trade Organization, 65 SASK. L. REV. 369, 371 (2002). 
71
 Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, More Power to the WTO?, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L.41, 64 (2001). 
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The fact that the WTO is such a dynamic institution and has undergone rapid ex-
pansion of late means that relying on the traditional trade/non-trade dichotomy, 
according to which labour is classified as a “non-trade” concern, has the potential to 
seriously undermine the WTO’s credibility. As the International Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions points out, “the WTO’s credibility is undermined when it en-
sures that Mickey Mouse has more rights than the workers who make toys, because 
it covers trademarks but not labour standards.”72 Similarly, the fact that opponents 
of linkage insist that labour is not a “trade” concern in the context of strengthening 
the enforcement of labour standards, yet in other contexts push for industrial rela-
tions reforms that enhance labour market “flexibility” in order to enhance the bene-
fits of trade liberalisation,73 begs a questioning of the relegation of labour to the 
“non-trade” side of the dichotomy. 
 
Problematising the trade/non-trade dichotomy does not require that it be thrown out 
altogether. After all, the dichotomy does serve to highlight that the linkage argu-
ment itself has conceptual limits. As Kennedy points out, well-meaning concepts 
can dominate imaginative space and crowd out other modes of understanding and 
acting.74 What is therefore required is a reconstruction — a reframing — of the 
trade/non-trade dichotomy. On this point, Garcia’s scholarship is somewhat instruc-
tive. He puts forward a model whereby “trade and” debates are construed as being 
fundamentally questions about justice: “linkage debates are not merely disputes 
over the accommodation by trade policy of exogamous priorities, but rather involve 
disagreements at the level of normative theory, over the proper construction of a 
just society.”75 The dichotomy can be maintained, and unwanted linkage subjects 
relegated to the “non-trade” side, to the extent that such subjects are unjust. 
 
In addition to the concept of justice, human welfare,76 governance77 and market 
regulation (of both product and labour markets)78 have also been evoked as con-
cepts through which the trade/non-trade dichotomy can simultaneously be main-
tained and bridged. As these concepts permeate both sides of the dichotomy, they 
demonstrate how linkages can actually be conceived as coming from within trade as 
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opposed to from outside of it.79 Rather than assessing which of these concepts 
represents a better tool through which to understand the linkage discourse’s primary 
conceptual differentiation, the most important thing to take out of the various cri-
tiques of the trade/non-trade dichotomy is that the rules it maintains are “contingent 
and a matter for political bargaining and adjustment, determined neither by eco-
nomics as policy science nor by some kind of “higher law”.80 This conceptual 
differentiation should therefore not be maintained by reference to concepts of purity 
and the like, but rather through an acknowledgement that linkage is complex and 
inherently a balancing enterprise.81 
 
B The Actors Dichotomy 
After the trade/non-trade dichotomy, the next most featured conceptual differentia-
tion in the labour linkage discourse involves the identity of the subjects and objects 
of labour linkage. To this end, anti-linkage proponents often rely on the 
North/South dichotomy82 in order to paint labour linkage as a scheme devised by 
the North in order to destroy the capacity of the South to achieve its desired eco-
nomic development goals.83 What is meant by the North/South dichotomy is a 
distinction between countries with large economies per capita against those with 
small ones. This is problematic for two main reasons: first, it ignores the relations 
within each bloc; and second, it ignores the relations within individual countries.84 
 
After one has undergone the task of dividing countries up into the metaphorical 
categories of “global North” and “global South” (ie EDCs and LEDCs), the utility 
of the dichotomy in terms of its use within the linkage discourse begins to wane 
once one acknowledges the sheer diversity of labour dynamics within each cate-
gory. In relation to the global North, labour relations and the social, political, eco-
nomic, historical and cultural forces that shape them differ greatly between, say, the 
United States, Belgium and Japan.85 It is therefore conceivable that labour linkage 
could significantly affect trading relationships between Northern countries. Even 
greater diversity exists in the global South, which comprises of countries ranging 
from China, India and Brazil, with large, labour-intensive economies and signifi-
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cant global political sway, to countries with small voices and small economies 
based almost entirely on wealth generation through agriculture. It is therefore 
highly likely that labour linkage could be used by Southern countries against other 
Southern countries, just as Indian, Malaysian, Mexican and Tanzanian unions were 
among those who brought a formal complaint to the ILO against the Government of 
Myanmar in relation to its record on forced labour.86 Labour linkage may often 
come to be evoked in a South-South context where one country attempts to enforce 
a labour standard but cannot maintain a competitive advantage, despite not being at 
a comparative disadvantage — the difference being that a comparative advantage 
comes through being more productive within the same regulatory conditions.87 For 
example, Nepal’s efforts to eradicate child labour from its carpet manufacturing 
sector have put it at a competitive (but not comparative) disadvantage in relation to 
India, where child labour is rife in the carpet industry.88 As such, the increased 
focus on core labour rights89 — as opposed to more “expensive” labour standards 
— seriously problematises the North/South dichotomy, because “not all poor coun-
tries are in violation of core labour rights”.90 To say that labour linkage will simply 
give an opportunity to the North to harm the South is to falsely assume a monolithic 
position from Southern countries.91 
 
The North/South dichotomy also ignores the fact that there are elements of the 
North within the South and vice versa. Gender inequality, racial and religious 
discrimination, entrenched casteism, and other forms of socio-economic disenfran-
chisement within many Northern and Southern countries mean that it is possible, 
and perhaps likely, that trade negotiators from different countries across the dichot-
omy have more in common with each other than with those on behalf of whom they 
claim to be negotiating.92 It is not uncommon for those who are disenfranchised 
within their respective societies at large to also be disenfranchised in trade negotia-
tions. Indian WTO delegations, for example, have recently included businessmen as 
well as the traditional bureaucrats and parliamentarians, but they have not yet 
included NGOs.93 Similarly, the fact that many senior bureaucrats and politicians in 
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Indonesia own shares in labour-exporting companies may partly explain the Indo-
nesian Government’s failure to adequately protect Indonesian migrant workers.94 
 
In many countries, particularly in the global South, corruption and a lack of free-
dom of information can exacerbate the problem of representation — within liberal 
democracies and dictatorships alike.95 This is evidenced by the fact that many 
LEDCs impose higher duties for necessities than for luxuries.96 Such practices can 
often be understood as symptoms of bureaucratic authoritarianism between the so-
called “unholy trinity” of local elites, the military, and international capital, which 
can ensure that policymakers are captive to interests that do not always intersect 
with the interests of the majority of their fellow citizens.97 In severe cases, bureau-
cratic authoritarianism can result in a “hijacking” of labour law and its use as a 
“strategy of political control”.98 In such cases, the key motivation for breaching 
core labour standards may in fact be the preservation of existing social relations 
rather than a utilitarian desire to enhance competitive advantage through maintain-
ing relatively lower wages.99 
 
The fact that the North/South dichotomy overlooks relations within countries also 
ignores the fact that labour exploitation occurs in Northern countries, and that 
labour linkage may therefore be capable of holding Northern countries to account 
rather than simply being a tool by which they can impose unreasonable standards 
on Southern countries. The United States, for example, has been criticised for 
violating international labour law by turning a blind eye to attacks on freedom of 
association100 — particularly with respect to plantation workers.101 The United 
States, and many other Northern countries, also systematically privilege migration 
law over labour law. The recent United States Supreme Court decision in Hoffman 
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Plastics102 demonstrates the point at hand. By a 5:4 majority, the Court quashed a 
range of remedies, including back-pay, awarded by the United States National 
Labor Relations Board to an undocumented Mexican worker, on the basis that 
United States labour standards are not applicable to foreign citizens who are not 
authorised to work in the United States. There are, therefore, parts of the South in 
the North, just as there are parts of the North in the South, so resorting to an uncriti-
cal usage of the North/South dichotomy hinders effective discourse on the labour 
linkage question.103 
 
Just as international law is beginning to move beyond its traditional focus on states 
as primary actors,104 so too must linkage discourse look beyond the state at face 
value and to relations both within blocs of states (ie within the North and within the 
South) and within countries themselves. This entails an approach which recognises 
that power and powerlessness, and their respective impacts on labour relations, 
transcend political and economic borders.105 To this end, “North-Southing” aspects 
of the labour linkage question can in many instances be substituted by simply 
“Rich-Pooring” the same aspect.106 
 
In some instances, however, the North/South dichotomy remains instructive.107 
After all, nation-states do remain, at least formally, the negotiating actors in interna-
tional trade policy. Furthermore, the grounds upon which Northern (or Southern) 
commentators — this author included — seek to question the ability of Southern (or 
Northern) negotiators to act in the best interests of their fellow citizens is itself open 
to deconstruction.108 On many issues, the South does hold a common set of con-
cerns, such as a collectively marginalised influence on the design of international 
trade institutions109 — despite voicing such concerns through a chorus that does not 
always blend harmoniously.110 Developing tools whereby such issues can be identi-
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fied and incorporated into linkage discourse through the North/South dichotomy is 
one of the key challenges to creating a dynamic labour linkage discourse. 
 
C Theological Dichotomies 
The third type of conceptual differentiation that features strongly in the labour 
linkage discourse might best be described as theological, in that it involves di-
chotomies that feature three inter-related Absolute Goods.111 First, Liberalisation is 
pitted against the threat of Protectionism that labour linkage allegedly poses; sec-
ond, Economic Development is defined against Poverty, with labour linkage 
painted as being an obstacle to the former; and third, Consumption is privileged 
over Production, the latter of which represents labour linkage. The following dis-
cussion is not to say that Liberalisation, Economic Development and Consumption 
are not worthy causes; the point is that it is not constructive to exercise blind faith 
in relation to them. Recourse to meta-narratives can, of course, disguise power as 
knowledge.112 Such recourse can also hide the possibility that that these Absolute 
Goods may not be entirely differentiable from their Others — the Atheisms of 
Protectionism, Poverty and Production. 
 
1 Liberalisation/Protectionism 
Many anti-linkage proponents attempt to demonstrate that the “real” dispute about 
the merits of linkage is in fact simply a dialectic struggle between Trade and Protec-
tionism.113 As the idea of linking trade to labour may in some cases result in one 
country refusing to trade with another, the idea is automatically painted as being 
Protectionist and a threat to the raison d’etre of the WTO: trade liberalisation. The 
first problem with this dichotomy is that one country refusing to trade with another 
does not necessarily mean that its primary motive is the protection of its own nar-
row interests. In fact, Protectionism may not even be a motive at all; given increas-
ing levels of economic specialisation, in most cases the next-lowest cost exporter 
that has complied with a linked labour standard will be a third country rather than 
the sanctions-imposing country.114 
 
The second problem with the Liberalisation/Protectionism dichotomy is a concep-
tual one: trade liberalisation itself, as the current trade policy insiders behind the so-
called Washington Consensus understand it,115 involves a high degree of Protection-
ism. The World Bank, for example, often speaks of trade policy and the protection 
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of private property rights as going hand in hand as poverty reduction strategies.116 
Through TRIPs, the WTO itself is now concerned with the protection of intellectual 
property rights.117 Similarly, while one of the primary objectives of trade liberalisa-
tion is to reduce government subsidies,118 few if any trade Liberalists have argued 
for a reduction in either positive or negative regulatory subsidies (or “false labour 
standards”119). Positive regulatory subsidies are provided by all governments and 
include, for example, limited liability and the corporate form of business associa-
tion,120 while repealing a law requiring air-conditioners to be installed in all shoe 
factories would be an example of a negative regulatory subsidy.121 In addition, 
neither policymakers in favour of trade liberalisation nor those in favour of labour 
linkage have seriously questioned the most fundamentally protective element of 
world markets: restrictive immigration policies.122 This may reveal hypocrisy on the 
part of those who advocate improvements to working conditions through labour 
linkage but not freedom of movement (the “yes, but not in my backyard” mental-
ity).123 However, it also demonstrates that the Liberalisation/Protectionist dichot-
omy is highly conceptually problematic. The point here is that contemporary 
immigration policy, property laws, the corporate form and many other practices — 
irrespective of their real merits — are Protectionist and often coexist with, or even 
reinforce, the power of the trade liberalisation discourse. 
 
A third problem with analysing the labour linkage question in terms of a Liberalisa-
tion/Protectionism dichotomy is that it often morphs into the potentially misleading 
jobs/standards dichotomy. This dichotomy holds that any effectively enforced 
standards that seek to elevate working conditions will automatically act as a disin-
centive to international capital and therefore increase unemployment.124 This di-
chotomy is misleading because economists and policymakers are actually split on 
the issue.125 While the jobs/standards dichotomy may hold true for a broad range of 
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labour standards,126 recent studies into the effects of core labour rights actually 
reveal that these particular standards may in fact support higher productivity and 
job growth. These studies have not been conducted by opponents of neo-
Liberalism, but by multilateral financial institutions. The World Bank, for example, 
has found that “union density per se has a very weak association, or perhaps no 
association, with economic performance indicators”.127 This is most likely because 
freedom of association can improve dialogue between workers and managers, 
prevent wildcat strikes, add worker input to productivity schemes and end the 
destabilising effects of underground unionism.128 Similarly, the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has stated that enforcement of 
core labour rights will in no way hinder economic development, with the possible 
exception of the prohibition on the use of “non-hazardous” child labour.129 
 
In addition to the World Bank and OECD studies, recent studies on Southeast Asia 
also call into question the jobs/standards dichotomy. These studies indicate that, in 
the wake of the recent financial crisis, manufacturing capital in fact moved to 
countries where wages were several times higher, due to factors such as security, 
corruption and domestic market size.130 This growing amount of literature problem-
atising the jobs/standards dichotomy in relation to core labour rights has even 
prompted Nobel Prize winner and former World Bank economist Joseph Stiglitz to 
state that workers’ rights are “key to democratic economic development”.131 He has 
also called on the Bank and related institutions to make such rights “a central focus” 
of their activities.132 As such, it is important to realise the limits of the 
jobs/standards dichotomy and that it exposes one of several serious problems with 
the Liberalisation/Protectionism dichotomy generally. 
 
The fourth problem with the Liberalisation/Protectionism dichotomy as it relates to 
labour linkage is that both trade liberalisation and labour linkage are actually both 
creatures of Liberalism. The current discourse on labour linkage, with its focus on 
core labour rights,133 emphasises individual freedoms, not the specification of 
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standards resulting from the exercise of such freedoms.134 These freedoms, as with 
trade liberalisation, are negative rights; they are freedoms from intervention. Just as 
trade liberalisation’s normative force comes from it articulating the right to be free 
from interference in the form of government-constructed barriers to trade, the 
current pro-labour linkage argument simply articulates the right to be free from 
unfair government/employer/worker intervention.135 The irony in two creatures of 
Liberalism being pitted against each other may be symptomatic of Liberalism’s 
inherently contradictory nature,136 and means that a reconstruction of the Liberalisa-
tion/Protectionism dichotomy requires a questioning of the popular relegation of 
labour linkage to the Protectionism side of the dichotomy. 
 
2 Economic Development/Poverty 
Since the entrenchment of the “development paradigm” in international law and 
policy, as marked by then-United States President Truman’s 1949 pledge to aid the 
“improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas”,137 “development” has primar-
ily come to mean economic growth.138 One high-profile development consultant has 
even stated that “an end to poverty… inevitably means higher levels of consump-
tion.”139 This emphasis on Economic Development above all else is, of course, 
partly explainable by the fact that it has suited the interests of powerful countries.140 
It is also reinforced by a dangerous fetish on the part of many well-meaning devel-
opment actors for things that can be measured quantifiably — an “only what can be 
counted counts” mentality.141 This approach militates against labour linkage in that 
it lends support to the overly simplistic “Bhagwati Prescription”: that the only way 
to end Poverty is to increase each country’s GDP by setting an increase in trade 
volumes as the number one priority, above all other poverty alleviation policies.142 
As discussed above, this approach is potentially incorrect in assuming, as it appears 
to do, that the unconditional protection of certain labour rights is incompatible with 
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Economic Development.143 In addition, privileging economic development at a 
national level, as is measured by the GDP and related indicators, ignores the fact 
that, even where it is successfully achieved, the rising tide of Economic Develop-
ment does not necessarily lift all boats;144 some boats may in fact only be lifted 
under the active protection of labour rights.145 Responses that argue redistribution 
should be left entirely to the nation-state ignore the power relations within states, as 
addressed above.146 Responses that instead argue — in a tone ironically similar to 
that of diehard Marxists — that distributional injustice occurs because the free 
market has never been given the chance to operate in a pure form,147 are perhaps 
guilty of adopting an economically autistic view of the world as ahistorical, apoliti-
cal, ungendered and without a living environment.148 
 
Post-development theory criticises the categorisation of Economic Development as 
the antidote to Poverty for different but related reasons. Pointing out how the devel-
opment paradigm conceives “the absence of western forms of technology… as a 
criterion not of difference but of underdevelopment”,149 post-development theory 
questions the so-called “adolescence myth” that some parts of the world are more 
developed than others in the first place.150 As such, the development paradigm itself 
is criticised as a “pauperising myth”.151 This position in turn has been criticised as 
overly romanticising the aspirations of many people in “underdeveloped” parts of 
the world, and therefore neglecting the fact that many popular struggles in less 
empowered parts of the world are actually about access to development rather than 
rejection of it.152 However, the post-development discourse does have the potential 
to make a useful contribution to the linkage discourse, particularly as it demon-
strates how the development paradigm in general often ignores non-Economic 
aspirations. 
 
This theme has been picked up on in the discourse relating to the emerging “right to 
development”. This discourse urges the development paradigm to focus on consid-
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erations other than simply Economic Development,153 and thus emphasises that the 
promotion of the market should not be an end in itself but simply “a means of 
promoting human welfare and social goals.”154 Article 6(2) of the Declaration on 
the Right to Development,155 for example, states that “equal attention… should be 
given to the implementation, promotion and protection of civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural rights”. In the context of labour linkage, this approach can also 
highlight the fact that many labour rights are capable of making dynamic, long-term 
“non-labour” contributions to development. For example, restrictions imposed on 
the use of child labour are said to have precipitated the public education movement 
in Victorian England.156 This is a clear reminder that Poverty alleviation requires 
labour rights to be balanced with Economic Development, rather than simply 
circumvented by resort to an “Economic Development loophole”.157 As such, a 
reconstruction of the Economic Development/Poverty dichotomy requires that it be 
applied to the labour linkage discourse in the knowledge that there are forms of 
poverty other than economic deprivation, and forms of development, such as the 
creation of dignified workplaces, other than Economic Development. 
 
3 Consumption/Production (Product/Process) 
A third “theological dichotomy” that frequently appears in the linkage discourse is 
the Consumption/Production dichotomy. This conceptual differentiation has be-
come an entrenched aspect of GATT/WTO jurisprudence, in which it is most com-
monly expressed as the “product/process distinction”. Before the establishment of 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), GATT panels established this dichot-
omy to assist with the interpretation of GATT art III — the treaty’s national treat-
ment provision. Under this Article, Members are not permitted, inter alia, to levy 
discriminative taxes158 or impose discriminative non-fiscal regulations159 on “like” 
products. This criterion of “likeness” was interpreted by the GATT Panel in the 
Tuna-Dolphin I case to not incorporate differences in Production processes. In that 
case it was held that “regulations governing the taking of dolphins incidental to the 
taking of tuna could not possibly affect tuna as a product.”160 Although the WTO 
Appellate Body (AB) has taken a more nuanced approach, it has essentially main-
tained this product/process dichotomy. In Japanese Alcoholic Beverages, the AB 
preferred a case-by-case analysis of likeness based on physical properties, end-uses, 
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consumer tastes and tariff classification.161 In the Shrimp-Turtle case, what initially 
appears to be a decision in favour of the Production argument was in fact based on 
the Article XX (General Exceptions) provision, rather than on an absence of “like-
ness” per se.162 Similarly, in the Asbestos case, the AB found that cement-based 
products containing asbestos were not “like” asbestos-free cement-based products 
primarily due to an absence of evidence that Consumers treated them alike,163 not 
because Production should necessarily be taken into account when examining 
“likeness”. 
 
Conceiving products as distinct from the processes by which they were produced 
means that Consumption is privileged over Production. In Tuna-Dolphin I, for 
example, the United States was free to regulate the Production process of tuna 
within its territories, but was in breach of Article III to the extent that it attempted 
to regulate domestic tuna Consumption by instituting a ban on the import of tuna 
caught using a method that incidentally killed large amounts of dolphins. While 
Production is essentially ignored,164 Consumption is thus conceived as too sacred to 
be touched by anything other than the equally-sacred concept of Market Forces.165 
This all relates to the question of labour linkage in that the product/process dichot-
omy has the affect of homogenising — or “abstracting”, as Marx put it166 — the 
labour that made each product’s Production possible. Due to the application of this 
dichotomy, a government would not be permitted to respond to collective demands 
by its constituent consumers that carpets produced by seven-year-old children be 
valued according to a basis other than the carpets’ “material shells”167 alone. 
 
The value in the product/process dichotomy is that it has served as a “fairly bright-
line bulwark against sliding down a slippery slope of blocking products at the 
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border” for purely protectionist reasons.168 For example, removing the dichotomy 
entirely, without replacing it with adequate safeguards, would make it a possibility, 
albeit an unrealistic one, for countries to prohibit certain imports on the basis that 
their Production did not involve child labour. As such, rather than disposing entirely 
of the product/process dichotomy, the labour linkage discourse would be best 
served by reconstructing it in a way that allows exceptions to the distinction based 
on actual non-protectionist policies.169 
 
D Regime Dichotomies 
The fourth kind of conceptual differentiation that appears frequently in the labour 
linkage discourse involves dichotomies relating to the question of what types of 
regimes are best suited to the regulation of workplace relations and the labour 
market. These dichotomies can therefore be termed “regime dichotomies”. The 
three major “regime dichotomies” identifiable in the labour linkage discourse are 
universalist/relativist, WTO/ILO and welfare/sanctions.170 These will be analysed in 
turn. 
 
1 Universalist/relativist 
The argument that labour linkage harms the competitive advantage of LEDCs, 
because it entails the imposition of international standards that are not compatible 
with domestic contexts, relies on the notion that universal standards are distinct 
from standards that recognise some degree of relativity.171 Having established this 
universalist/relativist dichotomy, anti-linkage proponents are therefore able to argue 
that certain countries or regions have the right to create their own standards with 
respect to the regulation of employment relationships and the labour market, and 
that it is not possible for them to do this within a framework of international stan-
dards.172 Aside from the problems relating to who is creating standards for who in 
such a scenario,173 this line of argument ignores the fact that an international labour 
regulation regime can be simultaneously universal and relative. 
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Different states can, and do, implement the normative content of universal stan-
dards in different ways; universalism is not absolutism.174 For example, in a study 
of seven East Asian countries, Cooney et al found that all had adopted international 
labour standards to some extent, yet these standards in turn adopted a unique char-
acter and impact in each jurisdiction.175 By virtue of the fact that legally “trans-
planted” concepts may be understood differently by the bureaucracy, the judiciary, 
the legal profession and the public in each country, it may actually be inevitable 
that each jurisdiction will adopt universal standards in a relativist way.176 In addi-
tion, universal standards themselves can allow for relativity. The ILO’s Minimum 
Age Convention, for example, allows countries “whose economy and educational 
facilities are insufficiently developed” to substitute lower minimum ages than those 
ordinarily required.177 Similarly, the European Social Charter Committee of Experts 
has defined a “decent standard of living” not by reference to an absolute wage, but 
by the universal standard of 68 percent of a nation’s average wage, thereby allow-
ing for differences according to relative economic development.178 Such examples 
highlight the misconception that universal and relative standards are necessarily 
mutually exclusive. The labour linkage model discussed below in Part IV thus 
attempts to reconstruct the universalist/relativist dichotomy so that it incorporates 
this knowledge. 
 
2 WTO/ILO 
A corollary of the trade/non-trade dichotomy discussed above179 is argument within 
the labour linkage discourse about which institution/institutions is/are best suited to 
dealing with international labour standards. Those opposed to labour linkage often 
structure their arguments on this point around a WTO/ILO dichotomy. The Interna-
tional Labour Organization, it is argued, is the institution best suited to dealing with 
labour, while the World Trade Organization is best suited to dealing with trade.180 
As such, efficiency demands that the twain shall never meet — other than through 
“mutual consultation” aimed at ensuring “consistency of actions”.181 However, the 
“you-cannot-kill-two-birds-with-one-stone”182 understanding of the role of institu-
tions in achieving social goals is fast becoming outdated; as Sen points out, “the 
idea of doing one thing at a time is, of course, full of charm… but it isn’t a great 
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guide to practical policy”.183 Instead, the idea that certain issues, like labour, can 
and should come within the purview of more than one institution is gaining cur-
rency within international social institutions. This is demonstrated, for example, by 
the increasing popularity of the “mainstreaming” paradigm within organisations  
such as the ILO  with extensive experience in working for social goals.184 
 
The ILO and the WTO are very different organisations; they have different man-
dates and different strategies for implementing them. However, rather than being a 
reason why labour should be assigned to one and not the other, this is a reason why 
it should be addressed by both. While the ILO’s modus operandi is to achieve 
desired outcomes through social dialogue and the “carrots” of technical assistance 
and development aid, the WTO is now increasingly making use of the DSB and 
resorting to the “stick” of authorised trade sanctions.185 Due to the fact that each 
dispute in relation to labour will have its own context and therefore demand a 
unique remedy, it is likely that a combination of these hard/soft approaches will 
achieve the best overall outcomes.186 After all, dual- or multi-organisational ap-
proaches are already a feature of the WTO. Dispute settlement, for example, often 
involves expert advice from international organisations in relation to various stan-
dards.187 Formal procedures could be put in place for the ILO to serve as an expert 
witness, compliance monitor and technical assistant in labour-related WTO disputes 
and their follow-ups.188 The fact that the ILO’s Constitution grants it the authority 
to issue trade sanctions,189 while the WTO has an established framework for manag-
ing such sanctions, is perhaps a strong enough a mandate for this.190 
 
3 Welfare/sanctions 
Several commentators claim not to be against the idea of international labour stan-
dards per se as much as the notion that they should be enforced by recourse to 
sanctions.191 Their argument is often that on “moral causes” such as the treatment of 
labour, “a good tongue-lashing… is more likely to work today than a bite.”192 This 
argument partly rests on the carrots/sticks dichotomy discussed above.193 It also 
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relies on another dichotomy, based on labour being an irrational “moral cause”, as 
opposed to the amoral, scientific pursuit of trade. It is therefore acceptable that 
violations of trade agreements — themselves replete with language privileging the 
amoral and scientific194 — be met with an authorisation of sanctions, while the 
authorisation of sanctions for the violation of trade-related labour standards is 
construed as such an imprecise exercise that it would put innocent people’s welfare 
at stake. 
 
To be sure, many of the claims that WTO-authorised trade sanctions will hurt those 
they are intended to protect are well founded. Where sanctions are authorised 
against an LEDC, for example, it may deprive it of the trade revenue required to 
improve its labour conditions.195 Even where an LEDC is able to bring a successful 
case,196 the remedy of authorised sanctions may not be attractive as this may de-
prive it of valuable imports and make no real impact on the target.197 
 
Notwithstanding these significant concerns, the welfare/sanctions dichotomy re-
mains problematic. First, the claim that current trade agreements are more rational 
than a mechanism for labour linkage is in defiance of the fact that many current 
GATT/WTO Agreements actually embrace the mystery, value judgments and 
irrationality they claim to exclude.198 If one accepts that it is possible for a rational 
application of sanctions under such Agreements, one should also consider the 
possibility that sanctions in relation to “moral causes” may be equally as rational.199 
 
Second, it is unlikely that sanctions will be authorised unless gross violations of 
labour standards have occurred.200 Rather, it may be the case that the real value of 
sanctions is that they can lurk as a potential threat to would-be violators as they 
bargain in the shadow of the law.201 As anyone who has attended a mediation ses-
sion prior to a civil trial would be aware, no party will bargain in good faith without 
knowing that going to trial is a possibility (albeit improbable), even where all 
parties may be convinced that going to trial is the most undesirable outcome. In the 
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same way, without the threat of sanctions there may be an incentive for countries to 
agree on unattainable or unworkable forms of labour linkage, and/or for the em-
powered elements of those countries202 to give lip service only to the implementa-
tion of linked standards. 
 
The third problem with the welfare/sanctions dichotomy is that although sanctions 
may harm some innocent people, their employment may represent the lesser of two 
evils.203 Take for example the concept of imprisonment, the most severe criminal 
penalty in most local jurisdictions where capital punishment does not apply. In most 
cases, imprisoning an individual will involve causing significant harm to innocent 
individuals  the criminal’s children, partner, parents, etc. The fact that such harm 
occurs is a good reason to make the process for determining guilt as robust as 
possible, to minimise the harm suffered by third parties, and to focus policy-making 
energy on macro-level crime prevention (eg through reducing unemployment, 
enabling greater access to education, etc). However, even ardent civil libertarians 
would be unlikely to support the abolition of imprisonment in all cases. It may be 
harsh, but the alternatives for both the innocent individuals and for society at large 
may be even worse without it. In some instances, this may be the case with sanc-
tions. 
 
It is common knowledge that “sanctions”, in both bilateral and multilateral con-
texts, is a dirty word among most international legal scholars, and perhaps deserv-
edly so. The UN sanctions on Iraq resulted in the death of an estimated two million 
civilians204  forty percent of them under five years of age205  and in doing so 
reinforced a former UN Secretary-General’s statement that sanctions are “blunt 
instruments”.206 Moreover, the sanctions on Iraq were unsuccessful in achieving 
their desired outcome, and perhaps even frustrated the situation. 
 
For all the problems associated with them, however, international sanctions are also 
dynamic instruments. The current trend within the United Nations Security Council, 
for example, is a move towards better-honed international sanctions  with indica-
tions of success in some cases. These include the travel bans that were placed on the 
Milosevic clique in the former Yugoslavia,207 the airspace restrictions placed on 
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Lybia,208 and the strict certification regime imposed to restrict profit-making from 
“conflict diamonds” in Africa.209 
 
There is no reason why the WTO cannot develop kinds of sanctions that involve 
less “bluntness” than sanctions as we have currently come to understand them. 
Trebilcock and Howse suggest, for example, that sanctions could go beyond even 
sectors of the economy, and instead apply only to particular businesses within a 
given sector.210 Given these possibilities, it is easier to imagine a situation where the 
potential harm caused by sanctions would be outweighed by the harm that would 
result from not applying them. In such circumstances, however rare, it would be 
prudent to question the welfare/sanctions dichotomy. After all, decision-makers do 
not have the option of criticising every avenue of action or inaction with which they 
are presented  when something must be done, sanctions may be the best option.211 
IV MOVING BEYOND ESTABLISHED CONCEPTUAL 
DIFFERENTIATIONS: A CROSS-CUTTING LINKAGE 
MODEL? 
The above discussion has examined some of the key conceptual differentiations 
featured in the labour linkage discourse, and revealed several of the “hidden contra-
dictions” and “unconscious desires” that exist within them.212 It is therefore hoped 
that such revelations will provide some “new space” between international trade 
law and labour rights discourse for further debate and decision on the issue of 
labour linkage.213 This next Part aims to build on these revelations so as to suggest a 
labour linkage model that cuts across some of the traditional conceptual differentia-
tions that have brought the discourse to a stalemate. In no way do I intend this to be 
understood as a comprehensive and coherent solution to the labour linkage issue;214 
the model I suggest is designed to demonstrate how the discourse can continue 
without constant reference to the traditional conceptual differentiations discussed 
above. In all likelihood, this model will in turn be based on conceptual differentia-
tions which, in turn, need to be put to further criticism: “the critical process must 
continue”.215 After all, justice may be an “experience of the impossible”.216 How-
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ever, maintaining a dynamic discourse may be a step towards it. In fact, putting 
forward new models for labour linkage may in itself be a form of action, as those 
who seek to derail labour linkage may find themselves making serious attempts to 
improve labour conditions so as to demonstrate that labour linkage is not neces-
sary.217 
 
A A Suggested Linkage Model 
The model for linkage I put forward builds on the international community’s in-
creased focus on core labour rights.218 It involves, controversially, the use of sanc-
tions  in a very limited set of circumstances. Under this model, the four 
“fundamental rights” identified by the ILO — freedom of association, freedom 
from forced labour, freedom from child labour and freedom from discrimination — 
would be made subject to a “comply or explain-and-enforce” mechanism in export 
sectors. Individual countries would have the option of electing to join either a 
“comply” scheme or an “explain-and-enforce” scheme. Electing the latter scheme 
would not, of course, absolve the country of its obligations to the ILO under the 
ILO Declaration; it would simply mean that the enforcement of those obligations 
would be outside the WTO’s jurisdiction. 
 
Where a country has joined the “comply” scheme but is found by the DSB to have 
permitted or caused any of the rights to not be enforced in its export sector, by 
reason other than institutional incapacity, other countries would be authorised to 
impose sanctions on it. Where a country elects the “explain-and-enforce” scheme, it 
has two obligations: first, it must submit an explanation to the WTO Secretariat as 
to why it has not joined the “comply” scheme; second, it must create and enforce its 
own laws in relation to the core labour rights within its export sector. This first 
obligation is essentially similar to existing regimes in various stock exchanges, 
whereby listed corporations are required to explain any deviation from best practice 
guidelines.219 The second obligation on countries that “opt-out” of WTO enforce-
ment of core labour rights is based on the North American Agreement on Labor 
Cooperation (NAALC),220 which includes an “enforce your own laws” provision, 
the breach of which can attract sanctions in relation to occupational health and 
safety, child labour and minimum wages.221 To combat the privileging of migration 
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laws over labour laws, particularly in EDCs,222 the “enforce your own laws” provi-
sion could include a requirement that non-citizens be afforded the same protection 
as citizens with respect to the fundamental rights.223 Not complying with these 
obligations would also attract authorised sanctions. 
 
A fair and workable labour linkage model also requires some reform to WTO 
dispute settlement procedures, remedies and the Secretariat. Due to the evidentiary 
burden faced by some countries in obtaining information about foreign labour laws 
and their (non)enforcement,224 ILO findings should be deemed to be sufficient 
evidence. Unlike under the NAALC, expedited proceedings should be permitted 
where, for example, there is a linkage complaint involving a large disparity between 
the legal resources available to the parties.225 
 
The model would include authorised sanctions for the reasons discussed above,226 
in particular the notions that in some cases sanctions may be a “lesser evil” or may 
be necessary in order to encourage parties to bargain in good faith. In such cases, so 
as to avoid punishing innocent businesses, sanctions in response to linkage should, 
where possible, be targeted at individual enterprises rather than entire sectors or 
countries.227 In addition, a test could be included whereby the onus would lie with 
the sanctioning country to demonstrate that the net human harm caused by the 
sanctions would be less than the harm caused by continued non-enforcement. 
Where the country authorised to implement a sanction against another is an LEDC 
and can demonstrate that sanctions will tangibly harm its own economic develop-
ment, it should be entitled to a different remedy. This could include a right to sus-
pend the violating country’s WTO voting rights or DSB-access rights, to receive 
mandatory compensation, or to trade its authorisation to a country that is able to 
carry it out. These stringent requirements for the authorisation of trade sanctions 
and other penalties mean that they would rarely if ever be used. This does not mean, 
however, that they would be useless; they would play a key role in enforcing certain 
standards by remaining a residual threat. 
 
Changes to the WTO Secretariat could include the establishment of a framework 
through which workers and employers can enjoy permanent observer status at WTO 
negotiations. This would address the problems associated with these groups having 
to rely on ad hoc invitations from their respective governments.228 Another change 
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to the Secretariat could be the establishment of a Working Group on Trade-Related 
Aspects of People Movement, which would be charged with investigating policy 
solutions that deal with the imbalance brought about by the simultaneous liberalisa-
tion of the movement of goods and deliberalisation of the movement of natural 
persons.229 
 
The most important feature of the proposed model is that it allows for a flexible 
approach to labour linkage yet seeks to firmly entrench the rule of law at an interna-
tional level in relation to what have been credibly identified as core labour rights. 
Key difficulties will lie in defining the standard of enforcement required,230 assess-
ing when non-enforcement can be attributable to institutional deficiency rather than 
an absence of political will,231 and determining the kind of situations where sanc-
tions will result in less harm than non-enforcement. However, problems involving 
standard setting, the adducing of motives, and the determination of appropriate 
penalties are the very essence of law. As with other jurisdictions,232 solutions to 
such problems can be found through the political process and through jurispru-
dence, the latter of which in this instance may be able to draw on the “margin of 
appreciation” doctrine developed by the European Court of Human Rights.233 
 
A further problem will arise by virtue of the fact that a great deal of labour legisla-
tion in LEDCs can be best described as “aspirational”, in that it “puts forth a vision 
of what reality should be”.234 Forcing these countries to enforce their laws, critics 
hold, thereby robs them of much-needed “flexibility”.235 Without seeking to en-
courage the kind of legal triumphalism apparent in many EDCs,236 it is important to 
address this criticism by pointing to the importance of the rule of law for both 
economic development and the creation of sustainable freedom in the workplace 
and labour market.237 
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While it is important that countries have flexibility in determining the content of 
their laws, the rule of law, when understood as authority being carried out “in 
accordance with known and objective legal principles”,238 demands an abandon-
ment of “flexibility” as to whether or not a law should be applied at all. This kind of 
“flexibility” simply gives the state the prerogative to conduct discriminatory law 
enforcement, thus serving to perpetuate existing power relations and ultimately 
working against both economic growth and labour rights. As such, the ILO has 
stressed the “need for a renewed role for the state, built on the rule of law and 
democratic institutions”.239 Across the globe, it is only in this way that law, and 
labour law in particular, will have any chance of significantly influencing other 
social systems, such as the state or the market.240 
 
B A Challenge to Traditional Conceptual Differentiations? 
Potentially the most biting of critiques of this model is its lack of political support. 
However, to make such a critique is to misunderstand my intention behind putting 
forth the model. In putting forward the above model, I do not intend to garner 
political support but to make room for political decisions241 — be they judicial or 
legislative.242 The amount of room created may be a function of the extent to which 
the model prompts ways of thinking outside the traditional dichotomies. As such, 
the discussion below turns to this point. 
 
1 The Conceptual Dichotomy 
The suggested labour linkage model challenges the conceptual dichotomy243 in 
several ways. Once one begins to talk less about the abstract and more about prag-
matic policy options, notions of purity and contamination become more difficult to 
sustain, because it becomes possible to imagine linkage as being part of trade it-
self.244 Suggestions for reform also demonstrate the fundamentally political nature 
of trade regulation; it becomes clear to see that what is within and outside trade is 
dynamic, and determined by decisions of negotiators, adjudicators and commenta-
tors rather than by divine order.245 (In this regard, further analysis of the trade/non-
trade dichotomy could learn from feminist critiques of how the public/private 
dichotomy has been presented as immutable, apolitical and pre-existing, in order to 
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mask the gender dimensions of power relations.246) Importantly, linkage proposals 
also demonstrate the limits of linkage. For example, the above model covers only 
four “core rights”, while other workplace and labour market standards are left to be 
pursued by means outside the scope of contemporary trade regulation. Trade and 
labour can thus each be linked without being fully consumed by the other.247 
 
The notion that trade and labour are neither mutually exclusive nor mutually inclu-
sive is further demonstrated by the suggested model’s application to export sectors 
only. This provides a clear conceptual link between trade and labour: people who 
produce goods and services to be traded internationally are those whose labour 
rights should be protected by international trade law. There may be significant 
difficulties involved with determining this scope: what happens, for example, if 
Nike respects the core rights of those who produce Nike shoes for export, but those 
who are engaged by sub-sub-contractors to provide the catering services to a Nike 
factory are denied, say, the right to associate? The answer will inevitably involve 
judgement and a degree of artificiality, and those who fall outside this scope may 
suffer — at least in the short-term.248 However, the very possibility that it may be 
politically plausible to distinguish a group of people as workers involved in trade 
from those not involved in trade, is capable of significantly disturbing the 
trade/non-trade dichotomy in relation to labour linkage and therefore creating room 
for political decisions. 
 
2 The Actors Dichotomy 
The proposed model deals to some extent with the problems posed by the 
North/South dichotomy.249 The idea that the governments of countries have primary 
responsibility for the welfare of their constituent populations is preserved, in that 
states are given the right to elect an enforcement regime. However, the authority of 
the state is checked by the requirement that it clarifies why (through the explanation 
mechanism) and how (through its domestic laws) it has decided to place itself 
outside the WTO enforcement of standards around which a broad international 
consensus exists.250 This check may therefore create a situation in which states and 
their beneficiaries are made more accountable to both domestic and international 
stakeholders. These stakeholders might include unions, industry groups, farmers’ 
associations, aid organisations and of course other states — from both within and 
outside the same North/South bloc.251 The concept of targeted sanctions252 even 
                                                            
246
 See generally Pahuja, supra note 43. 
247
 This should come as a relief to both those who seek to keep trade “pure” and also those, such as 
Pahuja, who support linkage but caution against an “add human rights to trade and stir” approach: Ibid 
41. 
248
 However, in the long-term the capacity of the export sector to establish standards for domestic 
production may neutralise this. 
249
 See above Part III(B). 
250
 And which, as far as the ILO is concerned, they are bound to implement by virtue of the ILO Declara-
tion: See above Part II. 
251
 Harry Arthurs, Reinventing Labor Law for the Global Economy: the Benjamin Aaron Lecture, 22 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 271, 287 (2001). 
252
 See above Part III(D)(3). 
2005 Reconstructing Linkage Discourse  115     
 
opens up the possibility that one state may sanction a producer, or a foreign sub-
sidiary of a producer, that is owned by its own citizens. Many of the complaints 
lodged against Mexico under the NAALC, for example, have actually been in 
response to practices by United States companies and their subsidiaries run by 
Mexican elites.253 
 
The model also deals with an anomaly within the North/South framework: migrant 
workers. For the most part, migrant workers are “non-actors” in the North/South 
dichotomy, as they fall outside what has come to be the primary responsibility of 
states: protecting their own citizens within their own borders.254 However, the 
model does not propose to compel states to afford the same rights across the board 
to migrant workers as they afford to their own citizens; this may actually cause 
harm to would-be migrant workers by decreasing incentives for host countries to 
provide them with beneficial employment opportunities.255 Instead, the scope to 
which equal treatment of migrant workers must be enforced has been defined as the 
four fundamental rights.256 Whether such a model is adopted or not, the putting 
forward of such ideas exposes fundamental problems with the North/South dichot-
omy and suggests the possibility of policy adopting a critical and more nuanced 
approach to it. 
 
3 The Theological Dichotomies 
The proposed model also challenges the theological dichotomies discussed 
above.257 The Liberalisation/Protectionism dichotomy is challenged by providing 
countries with the choice to “opt out” of the WTO’s international standards en-
forcement regime if they see this as an effort to unfairly undermine their competi-
tive advantage.258 This will also give countries that consider the jobs/standards 
dichotomy to be based on false premises, at least with respect to the fundamental 
labour rights, the chance to demonstrate the notion that the two can exist — and be 
improved — simultaneously.259 By requiring countries to be accountable to some 
degree with respect to labour rights within their own jurisdictions, however, the 
model perceives the inherent Protectionism within Liberalism; the “invisible hand” 
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of trade law is acknowledged as being unable to detect all forms of subsidies.260 
Similarly, addressing the issue of freedom of movement is an implicit acknowl-
edgment that Protectionism exists within the system of Liberal trade law. 
 
The concept of labour linkage itself is inherently antagonistic towards the notion 
that Economic Development, as achieved by trade at all costs, is the sole antidote to 
Poverty. Through presenting a number of values that may “trump” trade in certain 
circumstances, the proposed model attempts to reinforce the notion that trade is 
simply a means to an end. If looked at directly, these trumping values pertain to 
core rights in the workplace and labour market. However, given that these rights are 
in many cases preconditions for more general human rights261 and the development 
of civil society,262 the challenge labour linkage poses to Economic Development is 
a broad one. Even where a country opts out under the model, the requirement that it 
continue to uphold the rule of law with regard to the fundamental freedoms may 
itself be conducive to legal and judicial development. In this way, the requirement 
may be understood as permitting the prioritisation of Economic Development while 
also challenging the “development as Economic Development alone” paradigm.263 
Similarly, the permission granted under the proposed model for countries to treat 
products differently according to whether their Production was carried out in accor-
dance with international or domestic labour standards (whatever the case may be), 
challenges the traditional Consumption/Production dichotomy while reconstructing 
it in a way that does not permit countries to impose their own standards of Produc-
tion on others. 
 
4 The Regime Dichotomies 
The proposed model challenges the regime dichotomies264 to perhaps an even 
greater extent than it challenges any of the other traditional conceptual differentia-
tions. The universalist/relativist dichotomy is challenged by the fact that on one 
hand the model is “relativist” in that countries are given the autonomy to opt in or 
opt out of the enforcement of international labour rights. On the other hand, how-
ever, the notion that countries which have opted out should instead explain their 
non-enforcement and enforce their own standards, challenges the notion that labour 
is a matter that falls entirely within the scope of national sovereignty. This is con-
sistent with an emerging notion, as articulated in the Vienna Declaration on Human 
Rights,265 that human rights can be simultaneously universal and relative.266 An 
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application of the “margin of appreciation” doctrine would also see that domestic 
circumstances are taken into account in the context of applying international stan-
dards. 
 
The key role that the ILO would play in dispute settlement within the proposed 
model questions the legitimacy of the traditional WTO/ILO dichotomy. Given that 
under the model countries will require detailed information about each other’s 
labour laws and practices, the ILO would also be set to play a key ongoing informa-
tive role, outside dispute settlement. The various commitments, explanations and 
complaints tendered to the WTO under the model would likewise put it in a position 
to inform the “soft approach” of the ILO. As such, while problematising the notion 
that trade should be left entirely to the WTO and labour to the ILO, the model does 
not fuse the two. In this way, both a “hard” and a “soft” approach are made possible 
under the model. 
 
The inclusion in the model of the “hard” approach of authorised sanctions is obvi-
ously an affront to the sanctions/welfare dichotomy. When sanctions are examined 
closely, without beginning with the assumption that they are always inimical to 
welfare, it is possible to conceive of circumstances where sanctions may actually 
support people’s welfare, not just in the sanctioning country, but also in the sanc-
tioned country. This is particularly the case after one considers the actors dichot-
omy, which serves to foreground national interests and hide trans- and sub-national 
exploitation.267 That being said, however, the model is sensitive of the fact that in 
most cases sanctions will indeed be incompatible with welfare. It is for this reason 
that the model seeks to limit the types of sanctions available and the circumstances 
in which they can be authorised. This includes the use of better-targeted sanctions, 
the application of the “harm calculus test”268 and provisions for LEDCs who are 
authorised to sanction but cannot afford to do so. The anti-welfare impact of sanc-
tions is also checked by the ability of countries under the model to exempt them-
selves from WTO enforcement of international standards. Given all these 
prerequisites for the authorisation of sanctions, it is hoped that sanctions will only 
exist either as a threat to countries that do not bargain in good faith, or as a tool of 
“lesser evil” relative to all other options (including taking no action). In other 
words, the model challenges the welfare/sanctions dichotomy by proposing that 
sanctions be authorised in those rare circumstances where the dichotomy does not 
seem to hold true. 
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V CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The aim of this paper has been to encourage new directions within the discourse on 
linkage between labour and the WTO. After briefly discussing the background to 
the discourse’s current stalemate, the paper attempted to demonstrate how the 
arguments within the discourse have been based on a number of “conceptual differ-
entiations”. These have taken the form of dichotomies such as trade/non-trade; 
North/South; Liberalisation/Protectionism; Economic Development/Poverty; Con-
sumption/Production; universalist/relativist; WTO/ILO; and sanctions/welfare. A 
closer examination of these dichotomies demonstrated how they are often founded 
on unstable premises; in many cases neither the dichotomies themselves, nor the 
portrayal of certain arguments as belonging to one or the other side of a dichotomy, 
appeared particularly clear cut after a serious analysis. In the most part, the analysis 
problematised anti-linkage arguments. However, the analysis of the Liberalisa-
tion/Protectionism dichotomy also revealed some hypocrisy on the part of pro-
linkage advocates. In addition, the very fact that the problems associated with these 
conceptual differentiations have not been clearly and frequently articulated by pro-
linkage proponents is a deficiency in itself. With the aim of prompting a more 
dynamic debate on these problems, the paper then presented a potential linkage 
model. In finding that it is possible to suggest a model that challenges some of the 
traditional conceptual differentiations, this author therefore welcomes further and 
more sophisticated efforts to present theoretical frameworks and policy options that 
challenge established ways of understanding labour linkage. 
 
This author is confident that the labour linkage discourse will continue and become 
more dynamic. With the WTO approaching its tenth anniversary and its impact 
becoming more and more felt throughout the world and across a range of social, 
political, cultural and economic institutions, attention to the trade-labour link is 
only likely to grow and develop into serious political pressure. This author senses 
that the WTO itself recognises that its legitimacy rests on it being perceived as 
moving beyond pretending to be involved only with “trade” as defined by the 
narrowest definition of the term. At some point, it is likely the academic dimension 
to the labour linkage discourse will cease, and labour linkage will instead become 
an object of horse-trading in the realms of the realpolitik. Countries which currently 
oppose labour linkage may then, understandably, seek to use it as leverage to en-
force past promises about agricultural subsidies, textile quotas and other pressing 
trade concerns.269 The result may not be part of a “coherent program for world 
order”, but this need not necessarily be a problem.270 
 
The fact that the labour linkage discourse may evolve into something subject to the 
political constraints of trade negotiations should not discourage us from making the 
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discourse as robust as possible. After all, it is only through exploring new ground 
that labour linkage may enter trade negotiations, and the ground covered by the 
discourse will inevitably shape the political deals made therein. The labour linkage 
discourse may also have something to offer, and to learn from, other linkage dis-
courses, such as the discourse on the environment-trade link.271 However, the 
uniqueness of each discourse must be kept in mind; Thomas reminds us, for exam-
ple, that international environmental law does not have the same degree of consen-
sus as international labour law on the issue of core rights or principles.272 Another 
dimension to the discourse on the trade-labour link is that it need not be limited to 
the WTO, as there is great potential for the link to impact upon the work of the 
International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and various United Nations agencies.273 
 
To be sure, linkage is not the only way to improve global labour conditions. Other 
avenues also need to be pursued, including diplomatic approaches; the liberalisation 
of migration; extraterritorial application of domestic laws to transnational corpora-
tions; awareness-raising campaigns; international corporate governance reform; 
pursuing the labour-related aspects of anti-dumping and other commercial competi-
tion laws; corporate social responsibility; product labelling; and the effective trans-
nationalisation of unions. Indeed, focussing too heavily on linkage may 
“background” these avenues.274 However, taking this to mean that labour linkage 
should be dropped altogether, without a thorough analysis, would be falling prey to 
the all/nothing dichotomy. It would also be an affront to the thesis of this paper 
because, as this paper has attempted to demonstrate, the labour linkage discourse 
deserves better than stale binary logic. 
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